

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200210001-7

25X1

TOP SECRET

24 March 1965

Copy No. C

100



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET



25X1

24 March 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

25X1

[REDACTED]

2. Ceylon: Post-election government likely to be more sympathetic to Western interests. (Page 3)

25X1

[REDACTED]

4. Argentina: Military leaders concerned about Peronist gains in recent elections. (Page 5)

25X1

5. Notes: [REDACTED] Communist China; [REDACTED]  
USSR [REDACTED] (Page 6)

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

**Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Ceylon: The election victory of former prime minister Dudley Senanayake's United National Party (UNP) will probably usher in a regime more sympathetic to Western interests despite a continued non-aligned posture.

In the voting on 22 March the UNP and its allies won enough seats to command a narrow majority in the 157-member House of Representatives. The UNP itself won 66 seats and Senanayake, as prime minister-designate, will be able to name six appointive members. At least ten others will support him, drawn from among independents, minor parties, and five whose defection from Prime Minister Bandaranaike's party last December helped topple her government.

Mrs. Bandaranaike's defeat apparently resulted from her inability to cope with Ceylon's economic problems--nearly depleted foreign exchange reserves, extensive unemployment, and stagnation of industry and commerce. The UNP seems also to have exploited successfully a rising popular distrust of her recently acquired Marxist coalition partners.

Senanayake's victory augurs well for an early settlement with US oil companies whose properties were seized three years ago, resulting in the suspension of US aid to Ceylon. His economic troubles may be complicated, however, by unrest in leftist labor circles. The new government probably will seek emergency Western financial assistance to help it past the critical first six months. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

24 Mar 65

3

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200210001-7

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200210001-7

Argentina: [The extensive gains made by the Peronists in the recent congressional elections have apparently raised serious doubts in the minds of some senior military officers about the government's ability to rule effectively.]

[The various Peronist parties won more than 40 of the 96 seats in the Chamber of Deputies which were contested in the elections and now control 53 of the 192 seats in that body. Of these seats, 36 are held by hard-line followers of Juan Peron who were previously without any representation in Congress.]

24 Mar 65

5

25X1

NOTES

25X1

COMMUNIST CHINA: Premier Chou En-lai probably will make several stops in North Africa and the Middle East after attending the funeral of Rumanian party chief Gheorghiu-Dej on 24 March. Press and other reports have suggested that visits to the UAR, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen will take place sometime this spring. Chou is also expected to be in Indonesia on 18 April for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Bandung Conference. Party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping has been named "acting premier"; the last time such a designation was made was during Chou's ten-country tour of Africa last winter.

25X1

25X1

25X1



USSR: The Soviet party's central committee met today to deal with agricultural problems, but it will probably also announce further important personnel changes. The meeting is taking place at a time when political maneuvering among the top leaders seems to have sharpened. The assignment on the eve of the meeting of Leonid Ilichev as deputy foreign minister is a sure sign he will be dropped as party secretary in charge of ideological matters and suggests that other changes are in the wind. Ilichev's apparent demotion may be connected with recent personnel shifts which have been aimed at downgrading those officials who played prominent roles in developing the Khrushchev cult.

25X1

25X1

24 Mar 65

7

25X1

## THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency


The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET